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Abstract—Security monitoring via ubiquitous cameras and
their more extended in intelligent buildings stand to gain from
advances in signal processing and machine learning. While these
innovative and ground-breaking applications can be considered
as a boon, at the same time they raise significant privacy concerns.
In fact, recent GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation)
legislation has highlighted and become an incentive for privacy-
preserving solutions. Typical privacy-preserving video monitoring
schemes address these concerns by either anonymizing the
sensitive data. However, these approaches suffer from some
limitations, since they are usually non-reversible, do not provide
multiple levels of decryption and computationally costly. In this
paper, we provide a novel privacy-preserving method, which is
reversible, supports de-identification at multiple privacy levels,
and can efficiently perform data acquisition, encryption and data
hiding by combining multi-level encryption with compressive
sensing. The effectiveness of the proposed approach in protecting
the identity of the users has been validated using the goodness
of reconstruction quality and strong anonymization of the faces.
Index Terms—Reversible Privacy Preservation, Multi-level En-
cryption, Compressive Sensing, Video Monitoring
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern intelligent buildings rely on efficient automation
of various tasks ranging from traditional heating, ventilation,
and air conditioning (HVAC) systems to advanced intelligent
access control and monitoring systems, improving the quality
of indoor environment, for example, by ensuring a higher
degree of safety by hazard monitoring and by providing
significant energy savings [1], [2]. However, accomplishing
these tasks necessitate the installation of myriad sensors such
as monitoring cameras, with concomitant privacy concerns for
people living and/or working in such buildings. The recent
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [3] legislation in
Europe reflects these concerns and regulates the ways in which
sensitive data should be collected and processed, advocating
data and purpose minimization principles, i.e., limiting the col-
lected data and the information that can be inferred from them
to the minimum required by the corresponding application.
These issues are currently tackled by privacy-preserving
approaches that either attempt to produce an anonymized
version of the original data [4], [5], namely by obfuscating
the sensitive parts of the images such as faces or employ data
analysis methods with strong theoretical privacy guarantees,
such as differential privacy [6] or homomorphic encryption
schemes [7]. However, both approaches suffer from two main
handicaps, first, as they are usually non-reversible, discarding
thus the original sensitive information, and second, they are
costly in energy consumption and demand high-performance
data processing. An ideal privacy-preserving data analysis
method should a) enable reversing the de-identification for
authorized users without a significant cost in terms of pro-
cessing power and bandwidth, b) not degrade the non-sensitive
aspects of the data so that both the semi-authorized persons
can analyze the scene, e.g., for abnormal behaviour but without
identifying the people via their face images and the fully
authorized persons can analyze the de-obfuscated signal, c)
be lightweight in energy and computational requirements.
In this work, we propose a novel and practical privacy-
preserving solution for video monitoring applications such
as in intelligent buildings and spaces under surveillance.
Our method combines a multi-level encryption scheme with
compressive sensing (CS). The proposed approach has two ad-
vantages over existing de-identification and privacy-preserving
methods, namely a) it is reversible, that is, it is support-
ing de-identification at multiple privacy levels (as shown in
Fig. 1, where different end users can get different levels of
anonymized data according to the shared key, and b) it is
resource and energy efficient, since it can jointly perform
data acquisition, encryption, and transmission. Note that the
proposed joint acquisition, privacy-protection and encryption
scheme can be applied with few modifications to any kind of
non-video, privacy-sensitive data.
In our method, the privacy-sensitive parts such as faces or
other clues that will enable person identification for unautho-
rized or semi-authorized users, are obfuscated using a random
corruption matrix, and then the compressed and encrypted
signal is transmitted. We emphasize that compression and
encryption are realized in one step via compressive sampling.
The obfuscation matrix is separately encrypted and embedded
into the transmitted signal. Note that the proposed method
is capable of supporting multi-level de-identification, where
a different level of recovery quality is provided for users at
different authorization levels. The encryption, compression and
embedding of the obfuscation mask into the data stream are
performed in a linear fashion allowing for fast and energy
efficient implementations.
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Fig. 1: Signal flow in the proposed model and illustration of the three authorization levels.
II. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR WORK
CS has greatly impacted various fields of signal processing
since its inception in 2005 [8]. According to the CS theory,
a signal can be sampled using far fewer measurements than
Nyquist-Shannon type acquisition methods. For instance, CS-
based MRI imaging [9] or radar monitoring systems [10], [11]
have been able to significantly reduce the signal acquisition
time and bandwidth requirements over traditional approaches.
In addition to data acquisition advantage, CS is inherently
cryptographic [12], [13] since CS signals are linearly sampled
using random measurement matrices. CS-based encryption
runs thus in parallel with the data acquisition and is a low-
cost solution compared to well-known complex encryption
standards such as AES or RSA.
A. Compressive Sensing
Let s ∈ RN be an N -dimensional signal uniformly sampled
using the traditional data acquisition scheme. In a compressive
sensing scheme, this signal is linearly sampled using m << N
measurements, i.e.,
y = As, (1)
where the matrix A ∈ Rm×N is denoted as the CS mea-
surement matrix. It is well known that most of the signals
we encounter in real life applications have some intrinsic
structure, allowing for sparse sampling in some proper domain,
i.e., s = Φx, where Φ is generally an N×N sparsifying basis
and x contains the sparse coefficients with ‖x‖0 ≤ k. The un-
derdetermined system of equations in Eq. (1) can be uniquely
solved under the sparsity constraint. Using the knowledge of
the sparsity or compressibility of signal decomposition in a
proper domain (as given by basis Φ), we obtain the sparsest
solution as:
xˆ = arg min
x
‖x‖0 s.t. ‖y −Hx‖2 ≤ , (2)
where H = AΦ and  is the employed threshold for solving
the corresponding problem.
The optimization problem in Eq. (2) is non-convex and can
be relaxed into the following `1 minimization problem:
xˆ = arg min
x
‖x‖1 s.t ‖y −Hx‖2 ≤ . (3)
The uniqueness and stability conditions of Eq. (3) are well
studied in the literature. The solution of this `1 minimization
problem is equal to the solution of the original `0 minimization
problem in Eq. (2) if the measurement matrix A satisfies some
conditions [14], [15] at the cost of an increase in the number
of measurements.
B. One-class and Multi-class Encryption via Compressive
Sensing
The idea of using CS in a cryptosystem was first studied
in [16], where Rachlin and Baron used the CS measurement
matrix as an encryption key and investigated the possibility of
reconstructing the sparse coefficients x without the knowledge
of A. They have argued that even though it is not possible
to achieve Shannon-perfect secrecy [17], it is nevertheless
unfeasible for an attacker to recover information in polynomial
time [16]. Then, it was proved that when the sampling matrix
is i.i.d. Gaussian, then one can glean from measurement
vector y at most information about the energy of the original
signal [18], thus achieving perfect secrecy (given that, y is
normalized to have a fixed energy in each transmission, the
key A is sent in a secure channel and kept private). The
robustness of the CS-based encryption was further studied
in [19], where it was pointed out that even if an adversary
cannot estimate the secret key A, he/she may try to ruin
the communication with additive noise attacks. However, for
CS-based cryptosystems, the overall system’s robustness can
be satisfied to a degree even higher than that of traditional
encryption schemes, provided certain necessary condition are
met [19].
A multi-class encryption scheme was also proposed in [20],
where the authors deliberately perturb the measurement matrix
to adjust the recovery quality for different types of users by
using a different measurement matrix A + ∆A, where ∆A is
a partial perturbation matrix. However, their application to re-
versible de-identification schemes is not straightforward since
the corruption induced during the de-identification stage needs
to be separately transmitted in a side channel. To this effect,
the work in [21], [22] introduces such a steganographic chan-
nel that enables embedding some extra information directly
on compressively sensed measurements. This steganographic
channel and the resulting data hiding can allow efficient
transmission of the de-identification information. Thus one can
transmit encrypted and selectively obfuscated (anonymized)
images with the frame-specific corruption matrix, which al-
lows for reversing the de-identification process. Additionally,
this approach further ensures the security of the system, since
it is even harder for an adversary to decode the cover signal
itself, given that an extra noise-like signal is added to the
encrypted/compressed signal.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
We adopt the idea of using a perturbation matrix to obfus-
cate selectively the measurements related to the sensitive parts
of images for privacy preservation. We propose a privacy-
preserving method for acquiring, compressing and encrypt-
ing the information, but with the ability to reverse the de-
identification so that an authorized person can recover the
degraded part of the image using her key. This will be achieved
without using an additional secure side channel to transmit the
degradation mask. The degradation mask can be transmitted
within the compressed measurements stream. On the receiver
end, three levels of security are conceived. An eavesdropper
not knowing the CS measurement matrix A, (called encryption
matrix in the sequel) cannot decrypt the signal. A semi-
authorized person (User A) knowing A can decrypt the
signal, while she cannot recover the privacy-preserved, i.e.,
the degraded parts. Finally, an authorized person (User B),
who possesses the key kb can extract the degradation matrix
and thus, recover the full image after having reconstructed the
degraded part of the signal. The proposed method is illustrated
in Fig. 1.
A. Partial Perturbation of Encryption Matrix and Embedding
To conceal parts of image frames, we convert them into
vectors, s ∈ RN and then define the vector indices, j, con-
taining the privacy-sensitive sectors (this can be done manually
or automatically, e.g., using face detection algorithms) and
forming the set C. We degrade the encryption matrix, A, as
A˜ = A + M, (4)
where M ∈ Rm×N is defined as:
mi,j =

0 with probability p, if j ∈ C (5a)
−2 ∗Ai,j with probability 1− p, if j ∈ C (5b)
0, else. (5c)
Finally, we can encode the signal s with the degraded en-
cryption matrix, A˜, instead of A, before broadcasting it, i.e.,
yd = A˜s.
The perturbation matrix, M, can be then ternary coded into
a vector w ∈ RT as:
wk =

a, if mi,Ck = 0 (for any row i), (6a)
−a, if mi,Ck = −2 ∗Ai,Ck (for any row i), (6b)
0 else, (6c)
where Ck is the k-th element of the set C and a is the
selected embedding power. Note that for a system that has
a total data hiding capacity of size T , |w| ≤ T . The stegano-
graphic capacity T is dictated by the data hiding limits [21],
[22]. At this stage, an embedding matrix (authorization key)
B ∈ Rm×T , T < m is used to linearly embed the information
for de-identification of the privacy-sensitive measurements
directly into the encrypted signal:
yw = (A + M)s + Bw = Hx + Bw + n (7)
where x ∈ RN is the vector of sparse coefficients of s in
Φ, while the rest of the quantities are defined as H = AΦ,
and n = Ms. We also impose an embedding power constraint
‖Bw‖ ≤ PE in order not to harm the reconstruction quality
for the semi-authorized users. Finally, the encrypted measure-
ments yw are transmitted/stored as shown in the Fig. 1.
B. Recovery Algorithms for Different Type of Users
A semi-authorized user (User A), who has only the key
A, can apply the `1-decoding scheme, as in Algorithm 1,
to reconstruct the de-identified version of the video. The
privacy-sensitive parts of the images, e.g., faces, will remain
unrecognizable to user A. For the authorized users (User B),
we follow the recovery method proposed in [22]. To extract
w, we first construct an annihilator matrix F ∈ RP×m, so that
FB = 0 and P = m − T . We remove this embedded signal
by applying F to yw:
y˜ = F(Hx + Bw + n) = FHx + z, (8)
where z = Fn. Then, a pre-estimation of the sparse signal x
can be calculated as:
x˜ = arg min ‖x‖1 s.t. ‖y˜ − FHx‖2 ≤ . (9)
Hereafter, a pre-estimation of w can be found using least
squares:
w′′ = (BTB)−1BT (yw −Hx˜). (10)
Following this step, the 0’s in the ternary message can
be extracted using a simple hard thresholding to w′′, i.e.,
w˜ = w′′  1|w′′i|>η where  denotes the element-wise
multiplication operator between two vectors,
1|w′′i |>η,i =
{
1, if |w′′i | > η, (11a)
0 else, (11b)
and η is the threshold value. Finally, an improved estimate of
the embedded information is obtained as:
wˆi = a ∗ sgn(w˜i), (12)
and the sparse signal is recovered as:
xˆ = arg min
x
‖x‖`N1 s.t. ‖(y −Bwˆ)− (A + M)Φx‖`m2 ≤ .
(13)
The recovery algorithm for the fully authorized user is pro-
vided in Algorithm 2. The recovery guarantee conditions, as
well as a robustness analysis of the proposed embedding and
recovery algorithm are provided in [21], [23].
Algorithm 1 Reconstruction for semi-authorized user
Input: y, A, Φ;
Hyper-parameters: 
1. Estimate xˆ : x˜ = arg minx ‖x‖1 s.t. ‖yw −Hx‖2 ≤ 
2. sˆ = Φxˆ.
Return: sˆ
Algorithm 2 Reconstruction for full-authorized user
Input: y, A, B, Φ;
Hyper-parameters: 
1. Apply F to y : y˜ = Fy
2. Estimate x˜ : x˜ = arg minx ‖x‖1 s.t. ‖y˜ − FHx‖2 ≤ 
3. Estimate w′′ : w′′ = (BTB)−1BT(y −Hx˜)
4a. Thresholding w′′: w˜ = w′′  1|w′′i |>η
4b. Forming wˆ, where wˆi = a ∗ sgn(w˜i)
5. Obtain M from wˆ.
6. xˆ = arg minx ‖x‖1 s.t. ‖(y −Bwˆ)− (A + M)Φx‖2 ≤ 
7. sˆ = Φxˆ.
Return: sˆ
C. Reversible Privacy-Preserving Video Monitoring
Random, e.g., Gaussian measurement matrices are proven
to be optimal for reconstruction performances. However, direct
use of the proposed approach for compressing, encrypting
and transmitting video frames is practically not feasible. For
example, consider a 512 × 512 image and a measurement
rate mN = 0.36, i.e., 90.000 measurements each demanding a
different 512x512 random array, resulting in 80 gigabytes of
memory. A feasible alternative for the measurement/encryption
matrix consists of a matrix whose rows are randomly cho-
sen from noiselet transform bases which are then permuted.
Similarly, we pick the embedding matrix B from the DCT
transform rows in the same manner as these noiselet and DCT
transforms. The sparsifying basis Φ is chosen as 2-D wavelet
(DWT) transform. Note that these two bases choices, namely,
DWT and noiselet, are based on them being as incoherent
as possible. Furthermore, recent studies [24], [25] also show
that this type of CS matrix construction, i.e., choosing the
rows of the matrix from a subset of the rows of a basis such
as fractional Fourier, Hadamard, etc., still provides security
guarantees.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
The proposed reversible privacy-preserving method is eval-
uated on a typical video monitoring setup that is commonly
employed in such applications as analytics for intelligent
buildings, video surveillance, and intelligent access control
systems. We have used two video sequences (10 minutes
long, a total of 3,219 frames), which were captured from two
different cameras installed at Tampere University in a typical
area monitoring setting. The cameras provided two different
views of an office environment.
First, the ability of the proposed method to compressively
sense the scene while anonymizing the detected faces and
reversing the de-identification process is demonstrated in Ta-
ble I. For the conducted experiments we used T = 10000
Fig. 2: Sample recovered frames for the semi-authorized (User
A) and authorized (User B) (measurement rate 0.6)
and a is adjusted so that we can fix the embedding power
to a predetermined small value i.e., ‖Bw‖2‖Ax‖2 = 0.085. The
table reports the peak signal-to-noise ratios (PSNRs) averaged
over 3,219 frames for anonymized and for clear parts of the
transmitted frames. Notice that the semi-authorized user (A)
receives very poorly reconstructed, practically unrecognizable
face regions while the rest of the scene is well-reconstructed,
only 3-5 dB worse than that of the authorized user (B). For
user B, both sensitive and non-sensitive parts of the frames
are well reconstructed, the sensitive parts being slightly of
low quality. Two sample frames, where the information was
decoded using the semi-authorized (User A) and the authorized
(User B) key are shown in Fig. 2
TABLE I: Peak signal-to-noise ratios (PSNRs, dB) for
anonymized and clear parts of the video frames at various
measurement rates (MRs)
Concealed
Region
Outside of
Concealed Region
Whole
Frame
MRs User A User B User A User B User A User B
0.3 10.23 21.59 24.27 26.19 21.79 25.81
0.4 9.83 26.99 26.34 29.72 22.70 29.43
0.5 9.57 31.30 28.06 33.16 23.26 32.90
0.6 9.39 34.93 29.45 36.52 23.60 36.29
0.7 9.27 38.19 30.57 39.68 23.81 39.50
0.8 9.18 40.97 31.44 42.43 23.93 42.27
We also evaluated the ability of the privacy-preserving com-
pression method to withstand automatic recognition attacks,
where a deep learning algorithm was employed to recognize
the persons that appeared in the frames. To this end, we
employed a state-of-the-art pre-trained Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN), as provided by the dlib library [26]. The
used network achieves over 99% recognition accuracy on
standard Labeled Faces in the Wild benchmark dataset. For
the recognition experiments, we used the pre-trained CNN to
extract 128-dimensional face embeddings and query a database
of known faces. Nearest neighbor search, considering the
first nearest identity was used for the classification. In all
the experiments 6 different identities were used. A total of
240 face images were collected and annotated (20 frames per
identity were used to form the database, while the rest of them
were used for testing). The experimental results are reported
in Table II. The very low recognition rate is achieved for
the semi-authorized user (close to random guessing, 16.67%),
while the same recognition rate as with the original frame
is achieved when the measurement rate is higher than 0.6
(88.33%). Therefore, the proposed method is capable of ef-
fectively protecting the privacy of the users against a state-
of-the-art recognition method when the semi-authorized key
was used while allowing the authorized users to recover the
sensitive information.
TABLE II: Face recognition accuracy (%) when the semi-
authorized (User A) and authorized (User B) key is used.
Results for different measurement rates (MRs) are reported.
MR 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
User A 23.33 18.33 22.50 6.67 25.00 15.83
User B 44.17 73.33 81.67 86.67 89.17 88.33
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced a novel privacy-preserving
compression method, which is reversible and supports de-
identification at multiple privacy levels. The method can be
efficiently implemented to jointly perform data acquisition,
encryption, and transmission by combining multi-level en-
cryption with compressive sensing. We implicitly assumed the
availability of an ancillary technique to identify and select the
privacy-sensitive part of a signal; for example, a face detector
in video surveillance. The viability of the proposed approach
in protecting the identity of the faces was validated using both
PSNR reconstruction measure, as well as by demonstrating its
robustness against automated machine learning attacks. Future
work will proceed for the sequential update of the anonymized
regions. More extensive testing will be carried over system pa-
rameters using open surveillance video databases. The degree
of obfuscation needs to be tested also with human evaluators.
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